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ABSTRACT 
Despite the NASA X-15 program’s outstanding success 
in developing and operating the first manned 
hypersonic research platform, the program suffered a 
fatal accident on November 15, 1967, when X-15-3, the 
only aircraft outfitted with advanced pilot displays and 
an adaptive flight control system, was lost after 
entering uncontrolled flight at an altitude of 230,000 
feet and a velocity near Mach 5.  The pilot, Major 
Michael J. Adams, was incapacitated by the aircraft 
accelerations and was killed either during the ensuing 
breakup or upon ground impact. 
In light of mitigating risk to current and emerging 
manned aerospace vehicles, a comprehensive systems-
level analysis of the accident is presented with a focus 
on the electrical power, flight control, and 
instrumentation failures that affected not only the 
vehicle dynamics but substantially impacted the pilot 
decisions that led to an inevitable loss of control.  
Insights based on reconstructed flight data as well as 
analysis and simulation of the X-15’s unique adaptive 
control system, yield new conclusions about the 
reasons for the control system’s anomalous behavior 
and the system-level interactions and human-machine 
interface design oversights that led to the accident. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The X-15 research airplane (Figure 1.0-1) is widely 
regarded as one of the most successful high-
performance flight research platforms ever developed 
with its 199 flights and nearly 10-year operational 
history [1].  Many advances in the modern 
understanding of hypersonic flight mechanics, 
including thermal protection, structural design, shock-
impingement heating, air-data sensing, and hypersonic 
propulsion can be directly attributed to research 
performed using the X-15 platform. 
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The X-15 program conducted 199 research flights over 
a period of nearly 10 years.  During this period, the X-
15 set altitude and speed records for a piloted 
aerospace plane, and ultimately held the record for the 
highest altitude (354,200 feet; August 22, 1963) and 
highest Mach number (Mach 6.7; October 3, 1967) for 
a winged vehicle until the atmospheric reentry of Space 
Shuttle STS-1 in 1981. 
 
Figure 1.0-1.  X-15-3 in Flight (USAF photo) 
On November 15, 1967, X-15-3 was destroyed during 
the 65th flight of X-15-3 and the 191st flight of the 
X-15 program as a result of a structural load 
exceedance precipitated by a loss of control [2].  The 
research pilot, United States Air Force (USAF) Major 
Michael J. Adams, was killed.   
The causes of the accident are complex, beginning with 
an electrical anomaly associated with a drive motor of 
experimental equipment that had not been properly 
qualified for the space environment.  This electrical 
anomaly led to a series of electrical and 
instrumentation failures that will be discussed in detail 
in the following sections.   
A concern has recently arisen within the aerospace 
community as to the implications of the X-15-3 
accident as to potential requirements for flight control 
design, vehicle instrumentation, crew spatial/situational 
awareness, and abort modes of emerging manned 
hypersonic vehicles, launch vehicles, and spacecraft.  
Furthermore, some aspects of the anomalies 
experienced on Flight 3-65 have been incorrectly 
reported in the literature. Until recently, the accident 
has not been treated at a comprehensive systems level 
considering the human factors, flight controls, and 
subsystem anomalies simultaneously.   
The January 1968 report of the joint NASA/USAF 
Accident Investigating Board [2] that reviewed the 
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causes of the destruction of the X-15-3 is a primary 
source for the present discussion.  Importantly, the 
report lacks detail especially with respect to the 
function of the MH-96 adaptive flight control system 
(AFCS).  After an extensive search, many references 
were identified that provide additional insight into the 
operation of various aircraft subsystems.  The present 
report is of a study undertaken to assemble a complete 
picture of the aircraft and its systems at the time of the 
accident.   
The failure analysis of Flight 3-65 has also been 
considered from a perspective of the human factors of 
the accident.  The design of the pilot interfaces with the 
AFCS and of the instrument displays, the interaction of 
the pilot both with the aircraft systems and with ground 
control, and the management of the program at the time 
of the accident were important aspects of the event and 
are addressed in detail in a companion paper [3]. 
2.0 THE X-15 RESEARCH AIRCRAFT 
The X-15 was a piloted, single-seat rocket-propelled 
hypersonic research airplane developed under 
cooperative funding and program management from 
the USAF, NASA, and the United States Navy (USN).  
Initial design concept engineering was completed in the 
early 1950’s and a prime contract for three aircraft was 
awarded to North American Aviation in September 
1955.  The first of three airframes was completed in 
October of 1958.  
An internal layout drawing of the X-15 airplane is 
shown below in Figure 2.0-1.  The X-15 cockpit 
consisted of a single seat just aft of the RCS 
compartment and forward of the equipment bay.  The 
cockpit used a relatively close-fitting canopy having 
two planar windows.  Aft of the pilot station was an 
equipment bay containing most of the research 
instrumentation.  
 
 
Figure 2.0-1.  X-15 Research Airplane Internal Layout 
(NASA) 
The X-15 was carried aloft to a launch altitude of 
45,000 feet by a NASA NB-52 aircraft and the flight 
typically lasted 10 minutes from launch to touchdown 
[1].  The X-15 mission profiles varied substantially 
based on specific research objectives, but were 
generally classified as either an altitude or a speed 
profile.  The altitude trajectory, such as that of Flight 
3-65, consisted of an immediate engine ignition after 
separation from the NB-52, followed by a 2- to 2.5-g 
pull-up so that the aircraft velocity during the 
propulsive phase increased from Mach 0.7 at launch to 
approximately Mach 5.  The aircraft then experienced 
about two minutes of zero-g before a rapid onset of 
dynamic pressure associated with atmospheric reentry.  
The aircraft was stabilized at a predetermined entry 
angle of attack and decelerated at a load of 5 g before 
being recovered into an equilibrium glide and set up for 
landing. 
The X-15 program was not without frequent anomalies 
and a few serious accidents.  Aborts due to subsystem 
malfunctions were commonplace.  Owing to the short 
flight duration, generally poor radio communications, 
and a high reliance on the research pilot to troubleshoot 
subsystem issues, the pilot’s role in mitigating the 
effects of component failures was paramount.  In 
nearly all cases where major subsystem anomalies 
threatened the safety of flight, direct action by the pilot 
successfully prevented a catastrophic accident [1].   
3.0 THE 1967 X-15-3 CONFIGURATION 
 Instrumentation 
Except for supplemental research instrumentation, the 
instrumentation systems on all the X-15 aircraft used to 
measure the aircraft dynamic states both for the 
purposes of flight control and for pilot display were 
similar.  Flight measurement systems included the X-
15 “ball-nose” aerodynamic flow direction sensor and 
the Inertial Flight Data System (IFDS), which 
consisted of an inertial measurement unit (IMU), a 
dual-redundant rate gyro package, and a computer.    
The innovative ball-nose air data system or “Q-ball” on 
the X-15 was a hypersonic flow direction sensor 
mounted in the nose of the aircraft [4].  Accurate 
measurements of angle of attack (α) and sideslip (β) at 
high Mach number could be provided to the pilot down 
to a dynamic pressure of approximately 50 psf.  The 
ball nose was the source of the data for display on the 
attitude director indicator (ADI) “8-ball,” the pilot’s 
primary attitude instrument for dynamic pressures 
above 50 psf.   
The IFDS was used to derive inertial estimates of 
altitude, altitude rate, and velocity magnitude with 
acceptable accurate for about 300 seconds of flight [5].  
While the IFDS was the primary source of pilot 
information during the boost phase of the trajectory, it 
was considered non critical for the remainder of the 
flight when the availability of more accurate radar 
velocity data communicated from ground control 
supplanted the use of inertially derived measurements. 
At 50 psf, the pilot switched the source of attitude data 
from the Q-ball to IFDS and, at low dynamic pressures, 
the pilot’s Attitude Director Indicator (ADI) display 
was tied directly to the IMU gimbal resolvers [6].  The 
X-15’s ADI was a standard, freely rotating sphere 
called the “8-ball” in the center of the control panel.  
The ADI was a critical instrument because the typical 
X-15 flight profile prevented pilots from seeing Earth’s 
horizon until re-entry, so the precision of flight 
required by the mission and its experiments demanded 
constant reference to flight instruments.  
The ADI in the X-15-3 was significantly different from 
the displays in the other two X-15 aircraft.  During 
most operations of the X-15 aircraft, the horizontal and 
vertical needles indicated angle of attack error from 
preset and sideslip error from zero, respectively.  
However, the ADI in the X-15-3 aircraft was modified 
to enable the pilot to switch to an alternate display 
configuration called the Precision Attitude Indicator 
(PAI) that was needed to perform certain experiments 
with the desired precision.  In the PAI mode, the 
horizontal and vertical needles on the ADI indicated 
fine pitch- and roll-attitude respectively, rather than the 
usual angle of attack and sideslip. 
A separate set of body-fixed gyros, packaged into two 
identical three-axis assemblies, were used to support 
the MH-96 AFCS’s dual-channel redundant 
configuration for flight control rate damping [7].  In the 
event that the gyro output rate exceeded 22.5 
degrees/second, the failure monitor was tripped and the 
input from the gyro to the flight control system was 
zeroed.  Reset was automatic upon reduction of rate 
below the critical threshold.  No indication of this 
behavior was provided to the pilot [2]. 
Acceleration measurements from an accelerometer 
package separate from the IMU were used primarily in 
the pitch control loop and to provide a load limiting 
function in the MH-96 [8].  The pilot’s display of 
normal acceleration was provided by a separate, self-
contained accelerometer mounted in the instrument 
panel [5]. 
 The Flight Control System 
The X-15 flight control system configuration differed 
based upon the airframe.  On all three vehicles, 
aerodynamic control surfaces consisted of a vertical 
stabilizer with an all-moving rudder surface and an 
all-moving horizontal tail with differential actuation for 
roll control during atmospheric flight [9] (Figure 
3.0-1). During exoatmospheric flight when the 
aerodynamic controls were ineffective, three-axis 
attitude control was provided by a reaction control 
system (RCS) consisting of a dual string of 
monopropellant peroxide jets in the nose and wingtips 
[10].  Wing trailing surfaces included landing flaps that 
were deployed only on final approach.  Aft speed 
brakes were available for energy management after 
engine shutdown.  The jettisonable lower ventral fin 
was used to increase lateral-directional stability above 
Mach 6, but it was removed from X-15-3 after 1963 
when it found it was not needed during high-altitude 
reentries [1]. 
The aerodynamic control surfaces were moved by a set 
of hydraulic actuators supplied by dual-redundant 
hydraulic systems.  The interface to the servocylinders 
was linked to the pilot inceptors via a set of pushrods 
and cables with spring bungees and nonlinear gearing 
for artificial feel [9]. 
 
Figure 3.0-1.  X-15 Flight Control Effectors 
X-15-1 and X-15-2 used a conventional pilot-selectable 
“fixed-gain” three-axis stability augmentation system 
SAS with rate gyro feedback having a range of ten 
preset gains in each axis available for pilot selection 
during flight.  The SAS was required for entry from 
most flight conditions due to an unstable lateral-
directional mode exhibited by the X-15 at high Mach 
numbers and moderate angles of attack [11].  
Exoatmospheric stabilization relied on the reaction 
control system (RCS) using either manual inputs (on 
the left-hand controller) or a rate-damping system, 
which used one-half (one string) of the reaction control 
authority in each axis to damp body rates during the 
ballistic coast [12]. 
The X-15-3 used a more advanced experimental flight 
control system, the MH-96, designed to ease the pilot’s 
workload by automatically adjusting the gains of the 
aircraft’s aerodynamic control surfaces in response to 
changing flight conditions [7,8,13,14].  The MH-96 
was referred to as a “self-adaptive” flight control 
system.  A principal function of the MH-96 was to 
enable automatic blending of the reaction controls and 
aerodynamic controls during the atmospheric exit and 
entry transition phases.  
The control function of the MH-96 was based on an 
approach that maintained a small-amplitude limit cycle 
in the servoactuators of the aerodynamic control 
surfaces via modulation of the forward gain in the inner 
loop (Figure 3.0-2).  The automated gain changer was 
designed to maintain the gain of the aerodynamic 
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control at its upper stability limit and in doing so was 
able to maintain a nearly constant aircraft dynamic 
response over the atmospheric portion of the flight 
envelope as the dynamic pressure and effectiveness of 
the aerodynamic control surfaces changed. 
 
Figure 3.0-2.  MH-96 Adaptive Concept 
The MH-96 designers recognized that since the 
adaptive gain was inversely proportional to the control 
surface effectiveness, the adaptive gain could be used 
to determine the necessity of supplemental reaction 
control [7].  To that effect, the MH-96 incorporated an 
attitude-rate RCS phase plane controller with an “R/C 
AUTO” mode that automatically engaged and 
disengaged the reaction control system based upon the 
value of the sum of the adaptive gains in all three axes.  
RCS was enabled when the adaptive gains reached 
90% of their maximum sum, and RCS was disengaged 
at 75% of the maximum sum [8].  RCS control with the 
MH-96 was provided through the right-hand control 
inceptor that was also used for control of the 
aerodynamic surfaces during atmospheric exit.  Manual 
RCS engage/disengage for the MH-96 as well as the 
left-hand inceptor was still provided in addition to the 
“R/C AUTO” mode, but manual control was seldom 
needed during high-altitude flights with the MH-96. 
The gain modulation element of the MH-96 was 
configured using filtering to respond to changes in only 
a narrow portion of the frequency spectrum of the 
sensed control signal, which was taken at the output of 
the servocylinder.  The assumption was that only the 
small-amplitude limit cycle activity would be present 
in this narrow frequency range and, thus, would be 
isolated from other signals below (rigid-body control 
motions) or above (structural flexibility) this band. 
4.0 FLIGHT 3-65 
Flight 3-65 on November 15, 1967, was planned as an 
altitude flight.  The pilot was conducting his seventh 
X-15 flight and his third flight in X-15-3.   
The two flights immediately preceding Flight 3-65 
were also high-altitude flights and were made with the 
aircraft in nearly the same configuration.  The 
exceptions were that, for purposes of performing 
additional aerothermal and aerodynamic experiments 
on Flight 3-65, a panel of ablative material was added 
to the left-hand upper speed brake to test the adhesive 
and insulating properties of a material proposed for use 
on the Saturn launch vehicle, and a traversing probe 
experiment was added to the starboard wing pod.  Most 
instrumentation and systems, including the traverse 
probe experiment, were activated just prior to launch. 
There were eight primary science objectives, including 
boost guidance evaluation, solar spectrum and plume 
measurement experiments, the traversing probe 
experiment, micrometeorite collection, ablative 
materials testing, and several instrumentation tests.  
Orienting the aircraft during the ballistic coast involved 
use of a precision attitude indicator (PAI) mode of the 
ADI display to perform a tracking task at or near peak 
altitude such that the solar spectrum experiment 
(located in the aft experiment compartment) could be 
oriented toward the sun.  
Following is a summary of Flight 3-65.  For a detailed 
time line, see [3]. 
Launch from the B-52 took place at 10:30:07 with all 
systems operating normally, followed by ignition and 
the power-on phase.  At 10:31:28 (just prior to engine 
shutdown, which occurred at 10:31:30 and at about 
140,000 feet altitude), the IFDS computer and 
instrument malfunction lights illuminated and they 
could not be reset.  At 10:31:33, the pilot switched the 
ADI to the PAI mode and then initiated the wing-rock 
maneuver.  At 10:31:58, the pilot’s report that the 
computer and instrument malfunction lights were on 
was acknowledged by ground control.  By the time the 
wing-rock maneuver was completed at 10:32:20, the 
airplane had started a slow yaw drift to the right, 
ground control had seen evidence of control problems, 
and the planned roll angle during the wing-rock 
maneuver had been exceeded. 
Even though ground control knew that the IFDS 
computer was malfunctioning, the pilot was instructed 
to perform the computed α/β-check maneuver, which 
relied on using the display of IFDS computed angle of 
attack and computed angle of sideslip.  The pilot 
initiated this maneuver immediately following 
completion of the wing-rock maneuver.  During the 
maneuver, the aircraft reaction control system did not 
respond normally to pilot inputs and a negative sideslip 
gradually increased to off-scale nose right.   
At approximately 10:32:50, the pilot initiated the 
Precision Attitude-Tracking Task in accordance with 
instructions from ground control.  At this time, the 
sideslip angle had increased to 20 degrees.  The aircraft 
reaction control system momentarily resumed normal 
operation, arresting the positive yaw rate.   
At 10:32:51.2, the Flight Controller reported “Over the 
top at about 261” [actually, 266 (thousand feet)] and at 
10:33:01.4, the Flight Controller told the pilot that he 
was looking “real good”. 
However, due to a lack of normal response from the 
AFCS right-hand reaction control inceptor, at 10:33:05 
the pilot elected to use the left-hand manual control 
inceptor.  By the time the pilot began to use the manual 
control inceptor, the aircraft had rolled left to zero bank 
angle and the precision roll indicator needle called for 
the aircraft to be rolled to the right.  However, the pilot 
applied manual right-yaw reaction control, further 
increasing the deviation from the planned heading. 
At 10:33:39 and about 240,000 feet altitude, the pilot 
reported that the aircraft control seemed “squirrelly.”  
At 10:34:01, the pilot transmitted, “I’m in a spin.”  At 
that time, the aircraft had already reached peak altitude 
and was in a descent through 210,000 feet.  The aircraft 
attitude was approximately 40 degrees above the 
horizon and was approximately 90 degrees right of the 
planned heading with a roll rate of 20 degrees per 
second.  The aircraft had already completed one yaw 
revolution.  The dynamic pressure in this flight 
condition was still low but increasing through 
approximately 1.5 psf.  At this time, the dynamic 
pressure was still less than 20 psf and reaction controls 
were required.  The pilot reported the spin a second 
time at 10:34:16. 
The aircraft continued uncontrolled motion until about 
10:34:34 where, at an altitude of approximately 
130,000 feet, the spin was arrested and the aircraft 
entered into an inverted dive.  Three seconds later, the 
MH-96 AFCS entered into a large-amplitude 
limit-cycle oscillation (LCO) in the pitch axis with the 
stabilators moving at their maximum rate of about 26 
degrees per second.  As dynamic pressure increased 
during rapid descent, the motions of all the 
aerodynamic control surfaces produced rapidly 
increasing accelerations that quickly exceeded 
structural limits.   
At 10:34:54, at an altitude of 62,000 feet and a 
dynamic pressure exceeding 1300 psf, a catastrophic 
buckling of the fuselage occurred and the aircraft 
disintegrated into several large fragments.  The pilot 
did not successfully eject. 
5.0 FAILURE ANALYSIS 
At 10:31:07, when the aircraft reached about 90,000 
feet altitude, arcing from the motor drive of the 
traversing probe caused an electrical disturbance to the 
aircraft’s electrical system that continued until 
10:33:53.  The electrical disturbance caused failures of 
the computer in the Inertial Flight Data System (IFDS), 
of components of the MH-96 AFCS and of electrical 
components of the aircraft’s flight-control system that 
included spurious electrical signals to the servos that 
drove the aerosurface actuators.  Due to the design of 
the MH-96, this motion caused random fluctuations in 
the automated gain control from maximum to 
minimum.  In the following subsections, analyses of 
individual subsystem failures and their effects will be 
detailed.  
Traverse Probe Experiment Failure 
The traversing probe installed in the starboard-wing 
pod consisted of a servo-controlled pressure boom 
whose design was such that it would oscillate across 
the bow shock boundary, providing a measurement of 
the location of the shock.  The traverse probe relied on 
power from the aircraft and was interfaced to the 
primary 115-volt 400-Hz alternating current (AC) 
power bus supplied from the aircraft APU generators.  
The traverse probe experiment had been carried aloft 
on two prior missions in 1963, although neither 
achieved an exceptionally high altitude [1].  No 
anomalies related to the traversing probe were detected 
on these flights, which may have been due to the 
relatively short exposure to the high-altitude 
environment and to the lack of particularly sensitive 
electronics on the previous flights.  
Post-flight tests of the reconstructed traversing probe 
hardware concluded that below pressures 
corresponding to approximately 90,000 feet altitude, a 
starting capacitor associated with the traverse probe 
drive motor would first develop a corona discharge and 
then exhibit violent arcing to ground across an 
approximately 0.25-inch gap between the capacitor 
terminal and the chassis of the experiment.  Although 
low-pressure gas dielectric breakdown was already a 
well-known phenomenon, experiment designers were 
unaware that the COTS components used in the 
traverse probe developed voltages that far exceeded the 
Paschen threshold for arcing at X-15 altitudes.   
The electrical isolation for the experiment package did 
not adequately protect the aircraft main power bus on 
Flight 3-65 and the effects of the traverse probe’s 
electromagnetic interference were severe [2].  The 
arcing caused numerous subsystem failures, erratic 
motion of the servoactuators, fluctuations in the 
MH-96 AFCS gain changer electronics, and interrupted 
pilot access to the reaction control system that led to an 
eventual loss of control. 
IFDS Computer Failure 
The Inertial Flight Data System installed on the X-15-1 
and X-15-3 aircraft consisted of a digital computer and 
an analog stable platform (IMU).  The IFDS digital 
computer contained the mechanization of the 
navigation equations and was used to accumulate 
velocity data from the stable platform and transform 
this information into a coordinate frame suitable for 
use by the pilot and the boost guidance algorithm.  The 
principal outputs of the IFDS were the altitude, altitude 
rate, and earth-relative velocity magnitude.  In 
addition, body-relative velocity data were used to 
establish estimates of angle of attack and sideslip.  
During Flight 3-65, the accuracies of the 
IFDS-computed angle of attack and sideslip were being 
experimentally evaluated.   
At the onset of Flight 3-65’s electrical disturbance, the 
IFDS began a series of resets.  In each case, transient 
upsets to the power supply caused the IFDS to 
temporarily halt integration of the navigation equations 
and resume shortly thereafter.  This event occurred at 
least 61 times [2] during the less than 3 minutes of 
electrical disturbance.  Due to the loss of acceleration 
integration during the halt periods, a substantial error 
accumulated in the IFDS estimates of the altitude, 
altitude rate, and velocity.  Importantly, the failure in 
the IFDS computer did not affect the ADI display of 
aircraft attitude; when the ADI display was not being 
driven by the Q-ball sensor, it was slaved to the IMU 
resolver angles.  Thus, the erroneous data from the 
IFDS do not appear to be a direct contributor to the 
vehicle loss of control.  However, the devolving state 
of the IFDS displays, especially in that the altitude and 
velocity tapes were substantially different from the 
expected values, combined with repeated warnings 
from the IFDS error annunciator suggests that the pilot 
was suspect of any data originating from the IFDS. 
The susceptibility of the digital IFDS computer to 
power supply transients was a known problem, but it 
had apparently only occurred on X-15-1 and was 
suspected to have been due to a particularly high 
electrical load [6]. 
Servo Transient Anomaly 
Large transients in the servoactuators of the 
aerodynamic control surfaces during Flight 3-65 were, 
most likely, due to their sensitivity to the severe 
electrical noise caused by the traverse probe failure. 
Some evidence of this sensitivity had been seen on 
prior flights, but the effects were considered to be 
benign [2]. 
Servo transients during Flight 3-65 had two distinct 
and equally problematic effects.  First, the 
aforementioned coupling with the gain changer 
electronics caused the MH-96 to interpret the large 
servo motions as excessive servo limit cycles, and the 
MH-96 correctly responded by rapidly decreasing the 
gain to recover stability.  In doing so, the logic 
associated with the automatic RCS blending was 
activated, and the RCS was disengaged intermittently 
in synchronization with the servo transients.  The pilot 
was not notified of the disengagement. 
Second, the MH-96 AFCS included a failure monitor 
circuit on each servocylinder to detect hardover failures 
and completely disengage the stability augmentation 
for the associated axis (roll, pitch, or yaw) [7].  In the 
X-15-3’s MH-96, detection was triggered when the rate 
of the servo travel differed in sign from the expected 
rate.  In the event of a “damper reset,” two lights were 
illuminated on the panel to notify the pilot, and pilot 
action was required to re-engage the failed channels.  
In order to reduce the potential for supercritical 
operation in the event that the MH-96 was disengaged 
at a low dynamic pressure condition and re-engaged at 
a high dynamic pressure condition, the gain changer 
electronics were configured to reset the gain to 
minimum following any reset and delay return to 
maximum about 10 to 20 seconds. Consequently, in 
exoatmospheric flight, a reset would interrupt access to 
the RCS system during that time.  During Flight 3-65, 
this occurred at least twice. 
The spurious electrical signals to the aerodynamic 
servos caused random fluctuations in the automated 
gain control from maximum to minimum and erratic 
access to the RCS through the pilot’s right side stick. 
The aircraft had already attained large angles and 
angular velocities in pitch, roll, and yaw and the 
aircraft entered into a spin.    
Yaw Rate Gyro Channel Disconnect 
In addition to the hardover monitor responsible for the 
pitch and roll axis disengage, each of two redundant 
channels of each axis in the MH-96 architecture 
included a rate hardover monitor on the flight control 
rate gyro.  An ability to recover from a flight control 
rate gyro fault was a requirement of the MH-96 design, 
but a simultaneous failure of both gyros in a single axis 
was not considered credible.  Thus, the architecture 
was designed so a single failure could be 
accommodated by disconnecting the failed gyro, in 
which case the total adaptive gain (i.e., the sum of both 
channels in a given axis) would automatically increase 
to return the total system gain to a normal range [15].  
Unlike the case of a servo failure detection, the 
adaptive channels were not disengaged, and the pilot 
was not notified. 
The flight envelope provided to the MH-96 designers 
specified the range of angular rates in each axis would 
not exceed 20 degrees per second, and the gyro output 
amplifiers were designed to saturate at 30 degrees per 
second.  As such, the hardover monitor threshold in 
pitch and yaw was empirically set to a value of 
approximately 22.5 degrees per second. The roll 
channel used a differential trigger, but essentially 
operated the same way. 
During Flight 3-65, the onset of a spin brought the true 
body yaw rate above the hardover failure-disconnect 
threshold simultaneously in both yaw channels, which 
were operating normally.  As designed, both channels 
simultaneously disconnected, effectively opening the 
yaw damper loop and providing no yaw rate feedback 
from approximately 10 seconds after spin entry until 
10:34:29 when the disconnect circuits reset and re-
enabled both channels.  
Lacking any closed-loop feedback, the MH-96 total 
gain in yaw increased to maximum and remained there 
so that RCS control was available to the pilot so long 
as the pitch and yaw gains were near maximum.  
However, regardless of the RCS state, the pilot had 
transitioned to the left-hand stick and RCS yaw rate 
damping was unavailable due to the lack of rate gyro 
inputs.  The primary effect of this failure was to 
exacerbate spin development with no rate damping 
augmentation. 
MH-96 Large-Amplitude Limit Cycle 
Within seconds after the aircraft entered a spin, the 
MH-96 AFCS went into high-amplitude limit-cycle 
oscillations of the aerodynamic control surfaces 
causing load exceedances on the airframe that 
eventually caused the aircraft to break up at 
approximately 60,000 feet.  The AIB, unfortunately, 
deemed an analysis of the root causes unnecessary 
since the only example of the MH-96 had been 
destroyed [2].  An extensive analysis was recently 
undertaken by the NASA Engineering and Safety 
Center (NESC) to isolate the most probable cause of 
the MH-96 instability and to gain insight into the exact 
mode(s) of failure [16].  The results are summarized 
here.  
The MH-96 AFCS, coupled to the X-15-3 airframe at a 
fixed flight condition above approximately Mach 3.0, 
could exhibit two distinct modes of oscillation.  The 
first was dominated by the desired limit cycle 
associated with small-amplitude surface motion at the 
critical forward gain with no rigid body motion.  The 
second was a large-amplitude LCO involving the rigid 
body and the power actuator but not directly involving 
the adaptation dynamics. The presence of the LCO on 
Flight 3-65 appears to have been the result of a latent 
design oversight in a structural notch filter installed 
only on the MH-96 configuration. 
 
Figure 5.0-1.  Flight 3-65 Divergent LCO Reproduced 
in Nonlinear Simulation (M=4.7, q=390 psf) 
Nonlinear time-domain simulation and nonlinear 
frequency domain (describing function) analysis of a 
detailed model of the X-15-3 AFCS revealed that 
transition from the small-amplitude desirable LCO to 
the large-amplitude destructive LCO was caused by an 
inner-loop instability due to large system lag in the 
structural notch filters coupled with the the rate-limited 
power actuator (Figure 5.0-1).  The structural filters 
differed from the filters used in the fixed-gain SAS on 
the other aircraft, since the loop shaping requirements 
were different for the MH-96 adaptive mode.  The 
mechanism by which a destructive limit cycle could be 
introduced involved an abrupt maneuver at relatively 
high forward gain, where the power actuator would 
reach rate saturation while inducing large angular 
acceleration on the rigid body.  If this event occurred at 
a flight condition where the rigid-body short period 
damping was particularly low, as it did during Flight 
3-65, the rigid-body oscillation was then divergent, 
even with fixed adaptive gains.   This failure mode is 
not unlike a classical pilot-induced oscillation (PIO), 
where the pilot acts as the adaptive gain. 
While the adaptation dynamics of the MH-96 AFCS 
were not directly involved in the LCO phenomenon, 
the limiting circuitry associated with the MH-96 
adaptive loop could be saturated by large DC signals 
[14].  If this occurred as it did in Flight 3-65, the gains 
would ramp to maximum in an effort to reestablish the 
desired high-frequency limit cycle.  This behavior 
further amplified the large-amplitude limit cycle, 
leading to a loss of rigid-body control. 
The MH-96 divergent limit cycle had been briefly 
encountered once before during an X-15 flight in 1965, 
but it was considered sufficiently unlikely or benign 
that steps were not taken to understand and eliminate 
the behavior [2].  Instead, pilots were cautioned to 
avoid large inputs at flight conditions that might trigger 
the LCO. 
The investigation following the Flight 3-65 accident 
concluded from simulation studies that the LCO could 
have been avoided had the pilot disabled the MH-96 
and reverted to fixed-gain operation prior to entry.  It is 
important to emphasize that simply disabling the 
adaptive mechanism would not have enabled the pilot 
to recover stability, but since the fixed-gain backup 
mode also used the lowest acceptable gain setting, the 
gain was below the threshold that would sustain rate 
limiting.   
The role of the adaptive control law in the divergent 
limit cycle behavior has been largely misunderstood in 
the modern flight controls community and has been 
incorrectly reported in the literature [17].  In the 
models used for these past studies, the instability was 
induced by artificially injecting an 80% asymmetry in 
stabilator control surface effectiveness (control surface 
damage), and the modeled actuators, lacking rate 
limiting, had a bandwidth more than an order of 
magnitude higher than those of the X-15. 
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6.0 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis of the fatal accident of X-15-3’s Flight 
3-65 has highlighted several recurring themes in the 
scenario leading up to and during the flight.  As is 
often the case in accidents, a confluence of latent 
failure modes and sensitivities was compounded by the 
unique circumstances of the flight.  It is plausible that 
had one or more of these factors not been present, the 
accident would not have occurred or the pilot might 
have recovered control in time to effect a safe landing.   
7.1 Findings 
Insofar as the failures of aircraft systems, the following 
findings were identified: 
• The X-15 3-65 accident was caused by an 
electrical failure in an experiment package using 
COTS components that had not been properly 
qualified for the X-15 flight environment.   
• By the time of its deployment, the MH-96 flight 
control system had undergone multiple 
modifications to compensate for operational 
factors not accounted for in its initial concept 
designs that reduced its overall performance and 
robustness below that of its theoretically ideal 
operating characteristics.  These changes, such as 
the installation of a structural notch filter, were not 
rigorously verified or reconciled with the original 
design and stability assessment methodology. 
• The pilot’s inability to recognize and isolate the 
subsystem failures and safely regain control of the 
aircraft was largely caused by the lack of adequate 
display of safety-critical information to the pilot 
and to ground control. 
• Failure detection features of the MH-96 AFCS that 
were designed to improve reliability, when 
exercised outside their intended design envelope, 
malfunctioned and caused degraded performance, 
which contributed to the loss of control. 
• Of the major subsystem failures contributing to the 
accident, three (i.e., the IFDS computer failure, the 
servo transient anomaly, and the MH-96 limit 
cycle) had shown some evidence of failure on 
previous flights.  The program’s decision to 
continue flight operations without assessing risk 
and identifying the root cause(s) of these 
anomalies was a causal factor in the 3-65 accident. 
  
7.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations follow from the 
findings of this study: 
• The use of high-voltage electronics, and especially 
AC potentials, in space operations should be 
minimized to the greatest extent possible.  
Environmental qualification of high-voltage 
components for the target environment is 
mandatory and should include testing at simulated 
flight conditions, even if they are electrically and 
mechanically isolated from safety-critical systems. 
• The reliability and efficacy of electrical isolation 
and grounding schemes should be rigorously 
assessed to ensure that malfunctioning equipment 
cannot cause cascaded electrical failures. 
• The implications and risks of COTS components 
must be thoroughly assessed by system designers. 
• Analysis and design of flight control systems 
should explicitly account for saturation and rate 
limiting behavior.  Simulations (and when 
practical, incremental flight testing) should 
exercise regions outside of the expected flight 
envelope to include specific cases that induce 
nonlinear behavior. 
• If modifications are made to improve the behavior 
of a fielded design, those modifications must be 
reconciled with the baseline design methodology.  
If the design process is found to be deficient or 
poorly correlated with flight data, these 
deficiencies must be resolved and documented. 
• An automated system, the failure of which would 
compromise the safety and/or the operability of the 
aircraft, must not rely on a single source of aircraft 
or environmental data for computation of its 
automated actions. 
• A failure of the FCS must be made evident to the 
pilot immediately.  If manual control is possible, a 
failure must not interfere with the pilot’s manual 
and direct control of the aircraft. 
• Flight operations must not continue in the presence 
of unexplained malfunctions or anomalous 
behavior in subsystems or components. 
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